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Abstract
A fundamental pursuit in complexity theory concerns reducing worst-case problems to average-
case problems. There exist complexity classes such as PSPACE that admit worst-case to average-
case reductions. However, for many other classes such as NP, the evidence so far is typically
negative, in the sense that the existence of such reductions would cause collapses of the polyno-
mial hierarchy(PH). Basing cryptographic primitives, e.g., the average-case hardness of inverting
one-way permutations, on NP-completeness is a particularly intriguing instance. As there is ev-
idence showing that classical reductions from NP-hard problems to breaking these primitives
result in PH collapses, it seems unlikely to base cryptographic primitives on NP-hard problems.
Nevertheless, these results do not rule out the possibilities of the existence of quantum reduc-
tions. In this work, we initiate a study of the quantum analogues of these questions. Aside
from formalizing basic notions of quantum reductions and demonstrating powers of quantum
reductions by examples of separations, our main result shows that if NP-complete problems re-
duce to inverting one-way permutations using certain types of quantum reductions, then coNP
⊆ QIP(2).
1 Introduction
A fundamental question in complexity theory is whether or not worst-case problems have reductions
to average-case problems. A special case, random-self-reductions, concerns reducing worst-case
problems to average-case problems of the same type. Random-self-reductions exist for complete
sets of some classes such as PSPACE, EXP and #P. Such reductions are not known to exist for
NP-complete problems. Fortnow and Feigenbaum [FF93] showed that sets which are complete for
any level of the polynomial hierarchy are not (non-adaptively) random-self-reducible unless the
polynomial hierarchy collapses, giving negative evidence for this possibility.
More broadly, one can ask when the worst-case instances of one problem can be reduced to
random instances of a different problem, including basing cryptographic primitives on NP-complete
problems. Namely, can we reduce NP-complete problems to breaking the security of cryptosystems?
It has been shown that approximating several worst-case lattice problems reduce to average-case
∗Partially supported by National Science Foundation awards CNS-1617802 and CCF-1618287, and by the National
Security Agency (NSA) under Army Research Office (ARO) contract number W911NF-12-1-0541.
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lattice problems [Ajt96, Mic04, MR07], which ignited the booming of lattice cryptography and
breaking these cryptosystems is as hard as solving some worst-case lattice problems [Reg04a, Reg05,
AD97]. However, the worst-case lattice problems involved are in NP∩ coNP, which are believed not
NP-complete.
The pursuit of basing cryptographic primitives on NP-hardness has largely ended up negative.
For instance, if one can reduce NP-complete problems to inverting one-way permutations [Bra79],
size-verifiable one-way functions [AGGM06, BB15], single-server single-round private information
retrieval [LV15], or some weak fully homomorphic encryption scheme [BL13], then the polynomial
hierarchy collapses. In this paper we bring this question in the quantum computing paradigm: can
cryptographic primitives be based on NP-complete or QMA-complete problems if we allow quantum
reductions? Namely, can we establish the security of cryptographic primitives by showing a quantum
algorithm for an NP-hard (or QMA-hard) problem, whenever there is an attacker breaking the
cryptographic primitive?
Is this hopeful at all? First note that previous negative results in [BT06, AGGM06, BB15,
FF93] would fail when quantum reductions are allowed. Specifically, the hypothetical worst-case
to average-case reduction is used to construct a multi-round interactive protocol (IP(k) with k ≥ 3)
for the complement of an NP-complete language. Then we are able to claim containment of co-NP
in AM (and hence and collapse of the polynomial hierarchy), because of a nice result in complexity
theory that IP(k) = AM [GS86]. A direct translation of the classical argument in a quantum
reduction1, nonetheless, would result in a quantum interactive proof protocol with multiple rounds.
We would conclude that co-NP ⊆ QIP(k). But this is trivially true, since QIP(k)=PSPACE for any
k ≥ 3.
Concrete examples also exist where quantum reductions have proven more powerful than classi-
cal counterparts in cryptography. Regev [Reg04b] showed that the unique shortest vector problem
reduces to random subset sum problems via a quantum reduction. In addition, GapSVP and SIVP
reduce to the learning with errors (LWE) problem via quantum reductions [Reg05]. There are no
known classical reductions between these problems under the same parameters. In fact, the only
worst-case to average-case reduction for the ring variant of LWE (ring-LWE), which is a major
competitor in the NIST standardization effort of post-quantum cryptography, still relies on a quan-
tum reduction [LPR13]. Therefore, these are examples where quantum reductions appear to be
more powerful than classical reductions, when reducing from worst-case to average-case problems.
Kawachi and Yamakami [KY10] proved several hard-core predicates using quantum reductions, in-
spired by earlier work on the quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem [AC02] and the quantum algorithm
for the Legendre symbol [VDHI06].
As existing negative results fail in the quantum setting and quantum reductions are shown to be
more powerful than classical ones, it seems to be a live possibility that we can base cryptographic
primitives on NP-hard or even QMA-hard problems via quantum reductions!
Our results. We give a general investigation of using quantum reductions in basing the basic
primitive one-way permutation (function) on NP-hardness. Our contributions are summarized
below.
We first generalize two central classical notions, locally random reduction due to Feigenbaum
and Lance Fortnow [FF93] and worst-case to average-case reduction due to Bogdanov and Tre-
visan [BT06], into the quantum setting. Locally random reductions are commonplace in reductions
between lattice problems in [Ajt96, Mic04, MR07], and Regev’s reduction for LWE [Reg05] natu-
rally falls in our quantum analogue of locally random reductions. Bogdanov and Trevision’s notion
1In some cases, such translation does not exist due to some properties of quantum information
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is more general, and our quantum formalization also allows to reason about more powerful quantum
reductions. We then give some characterizations of the quantum reductions we define. We show
that certain restrictions on the quantum reductions will be too week to be interesting. For instance,
if a quantum reduction only issues entangled queries reminiscent of Bell states, it will not be able
to base one-way permutation on a language beyond BQP. On the other hand, we give a couple
of examples in the oracle setting that quantum reductions are provably more powerful than their
classical counterparts.
Our main result is showing that the existence of some quantum reductions implies unknown
consequences in complexity.
Theorem 1.1. The existence of locally quantum reductions where the queries are non-adaptive and
are according to smooth-computable distributions from an NP-complete problem (or QMA-complete
problem) to the task of inverting one-way permutations implies coNP (or coQMA) ⊆ QIP(2).
A distribution D is smooth-computable if its maximum and minimum are only polynomially
larger and smaller than the average, and given any x, the probability Prx∼D[x] can be computed
efficiently. In particular, this rules out uniform distributions, which are essential in existing worst-
case to average-case reductions [FF93, Ajt96, Mic04, MR07, Reg04a, AD97, Reg05]. We also take
an initial step towards the case of one-way functions. We show that if an attacker on for a one-way
function is giving as a quantum-sampling oracle, then any locally quantum reduction will result in
the same negative situation that coNP ⊆ QIP(2).
As indicated before, direct translation of the classical proofs will only give quantum interactive
proof systems with more than three messages, which will already coincide with PSPACE. We develop
a checking technique to mitigate the difficulty and design a two-message protocol. Interestingly,
our protocol illustrates a new way of designing QIP(2) than the few existing ones [Ros09, HMW14,
KLGN15].
Admittedly, the containment coNP ⊆ QIP(2) is not as strong as the classical result that the
polynomial hierarchy collapses. So far there is very little known about QIP(2) other than the simple
fact that QMA⊆ QIP(2)⊆ QIP(3)=PSPACE, and there are only a few problems [Ros09, HMW14,
KLGN15] proven to be in QIP(2) that are not known to be in AM or QMA. It is an open question
to pin down where QIP(2)stands precisely in the complexity zoo. As a partial progress, we show in
Section 6 an oracle problem which is in coNPO but not in QIP(2)O .
Overview of the proof of our main result. In order to describe the approach, we give more
details about the classical approach. The classical proof strategy is to assume that a language L
has a random reduction to another problem L′, and then construct an interactive proof for L (the
complement of L) that induces a collapse. For example, if L is NP-complete and has a random
reduction to inverting a one-way permutation, then there is a two round protocol for deciding if
x ∈ L. The verifier runs the generator G to generate the queries for the one-way permutation
and sends them to the prover. The prover then sends back the answers. Because the verifier can
evaluate the one-way permutation, the prover’s answers can be checked, and then R is run to decide
if x ∈ L. Finally, the verifier can give the opposite answer. This results in a two round protocol
for L. Therefore if such a reduction exists, then coNP ⊆ AM, giving a collapse. There are much
more complicated constructions when other average-case problems are considered, for example, for
reducing worst-case NP-complete problems to distributional NP problems. It is more difficult to
find an interactive proof in this case because if the prover answers y 6∈ L′, then the verifier has no
way to verify this. Nevertheless, with classical non-adaptive reductions it is possible to construct a
protocol for L [BT06].
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Carrying over the proof strategy to the quantum setting requires resolving several difficulties.
We use the unitaries G and R from the reduction to construct a quantum interactive proof for
L. First the unitary G is used to create superposition queries which are sent to the prover. An
honest prover will answer the superposition queries for the average-case language and send the
states back. The verifier can then use the unitary R to decide whether to accept or reject. The
first difficultly that arises in following this approach is that superposition queries are being used,
which makes it harder to verify that the prover is not cheating than it is for classical answers.
Another limiting factor also immediately arises in the quantum case that does not exist in the
classical case. For classical reductions and protocols, it is fine to create a protocol with many (but
still constant) rounds of communication, because there is an equivalent two round protocol. This is
done in [BT06] where upper and lower bound protocols are used to bound the sizes of sets. However,
in the quantum case, we are limited to finding quantum interactive proofs with only two rounds to
begin with, since QIP(m) = QIP(3) = PSPACE. Finding a quantum protocol that is limited even
to three rounds would only allow the conclusion that coNP ⊆ QIP(m) = PSPACE, which does not
yield a non-trivial result.
The main technical challenge is to ensure that the prover provides the answers honestly in
superposition to the average-case problem. A cheating prover would try to return some other state
that makes the unitary R answer in the opposite way than it should. Should the prover return
such a state, the verifier must be able to detect this. Our approach is to let the verifier create a
superposition of two states: the query state that is needed for the reduction, and a trap state with
the property that it can be used to detect that the prover is cheating. We show that there is a trap
state so that whenever the prover changes the query part of the superposition, then the trap part
of the superposition must also change, and that this can be detected by the verifier.
Future directions. There are several open questions. Do adaptive and/or non-smooth-computable
quantum reductions from NP-complete problems to inverting one-way permutations exist? Can we
generalize the result for permutations to other functions such as 2-to-1 functions or even preimage-
size-verifiable functions? We observe that (Appendix 5.3) if the oracle in the reductions is capable
of quantum sampling all solutions, then the existence of such reductions from NP-hard problems
to inverting k-to-1 surjective functions also implies coNP ⊆ QIP(2). Moreover, for cryptographic
primitives which have more structures than one-way functions, it is possible that we can construct
QIP(2) protocol easily. Hence, we would like to know if we can also show that basing these crypto-
graphic primitives on NP-hard problems via quantum reduction is unlikely. On the other hand, we
are also interested to know if we can find cryptographic primitives whose security are not likely to
be based on NP-complete problems under classical reductions, but can be if quantum reductions
are allowed. In the last, is it possible to rule out a quantum reduction from NP-complete problems
to average-case problems in NP? Since we know very little about QIP(2), can we show that QIP(2)
6= QMA, QIP(2) 6= AM, QIP(2) 6=QIP(3), or coNP* QIP(2)?
2 Preliminaries
For a finite set X, |X| denotes the size of X. We use x ← X to mean that x is drawn uniformly
at random from X. poly(·) denotes an unspecified polynomial, and negl(n) denotes a negligible
function in n. A function ǫ(n) is negligible if for all polynomials p(n), ǫ(n) < 1/p(n) for large enough
n. Classical efficient computation is described by probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms.
We assume basic familiarity with quantum information formalism. In this paper, quantum
register represents a collection of qubits that we view as a single unit. We typically use capital
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letters to denote a register and the Hilbert space associated with it. A quantum channel Φ describes
any physically admissible transformation of quantum states, which is mathematically a completely
positive, trace-preserving linear map.
We recall the definitions of quantum interactive proofs (QIP) and one-way permutations (OWP).
Definition 2.1 (QIP(m)). A promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano) is in the complexity class QIP(m)
if there exists a polynomial-time quantum verifier which exchanges at most m quantum messages
of length O(poly(|x|)) with a prover and has the properties:
• (Completeness) For x ∈ Ayes, there exists a prover who can convince the verifier to accept x
with probability at least 2/3.
• (Soundness) For x ∈ Ano, no prover can convince the verifier with probability greater than
1/3.
Without loss of generality, the prover and the verifier can be described as unitaries. It has been
shown that QIP(m)=QIP(3)=PSPACE for m ≥ 3 [KW00, JJUW11]. It is known that completeness
and soundness can be reduced to negligibly small [JUW09]. In this work, we focus on the class
QIP(2).
Definition 2.2 (One-way permutation). f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is a one-way permutation if
• for every n, f is a polynomial-time computable permutation over {0, 1}n by either quantum
or classical algorithms, and
• for every quantum polynomial-time algorithm A, Prx←{0,1}n(A(f(x)) = x) = negl(n).
We denote inverting a one-way permutation as Inv-OWP.
2.1 Formal definitions of classical reductions
We review two defintions of worst-case to average-case reductions that are central in the classical
literature. We denote P ′ an arbitrary decision, promise or search problem. We will only consider
the case where P ′ corresponds to inverting one-way permutations. We recall the basic notion of a
distributional problem.
Definition 2.3. Let P ′ be a problem and D a collection of distributions {Dn}n∈N. The distribu-
tional problem (P ′,D) is: given an instance x chosen randomly according to Dn, compute P ′(x).
One important notion of worst-to-average reductions is due to Feigenbaum and Fortnow [FF93],
which we decribe here (with minor adaption).
Definition 2.4 (non-adaptive locally random reduction (G,R)). Let k and ℓ be polynomials in
the input length n, and r is a random string chosen uniformly from {0, 1}ℓ. A decision problem P
is non-adaptively locally random reducible to a distributional problem (P ′,D) with error ǫ if there
are polynomial-time algorithms R and G satisfying:
• For all n and x ∈ {0, 1}n, P(x) = R(x, r,P ′(G(1, x, r)), . . . ,P ′(G(k, x, r))) for at least 1 − ǫ
of all r ∈ {0, 1}ℓ.
• For all n, for {x1, x2} ∈ {0, 1}n, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then for all y we have Prr[G(i, x1, r) = y] =
Prr[G(i, x2, r) = y] = Pr[y ∼ Dn].
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We note that Definition 2.4 is equivalent to the Definition 2.1 in [FF93] when ǫ = 1/4. One
can let each query be generated according to different fixed distributions in the locally random
reduction. However, Definition 2.4 which assumes all queries are drawn from the same distribution is
still general. This can be made without loss of generality since one can apply a random permutation
to the queries before sending them to the oracle and undo the permutation before applying R. This
way, the distributions of each query are the same.
If we only consider D to be the uniform distribution, then this reduction is a special case
considered by Feigenbaum et al. in [FKN90]. One can also define adaptive locally random reductions
by allowing the algorithm G in Definition 2.4 to generate queries depending on the previous queries
and answers.
If P = P ′, then the reduction is also called a random-self reduction [FF93]. It has been shown
that the set of complete problems in PSPACE, EXP and #P are random-self reducible [FF93]. On
the other hand, it has been shown that NP-complete problems are not non-adaptive random-self
reducible unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level [FF93].
Note that the definition of Feigenbaum and Fortnow [FF93] assumes a perfect solver for the
average-case problem. This restriction is weakened in a later work by Bogdanov and Trevisan [BT06],
which gives another important notion of worst-to-average reductions below. To describe it, we first
define δ-close problems.
Definition 2.5. A problem P ′′ is δ-close to another problem P ′ with respect to D if for all n,
Prx∼Dn(P ′′(x) 6= P ′(x)) < δ.
Definition 2.6 (non-adaptive worst-case to average-case reduction). Let k and ℓ be variables
polynomial in the input length n, and r is a random string chosen uniformly from {0, 1}ℓ. A
decision problem P is non-adaptive worst-case to average-case reducible to (P ′,D) with average
hardness δ and error ǫ if there are polynomial-time algorithms R and G satisfying that:
for any n ∈ N, and on all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n, let y1, . . . , yk be the outputs of G(x, r). For any
P ′′ which is δ-close to P ′ with respect to D,
Pr
r
[R(x, r,P ′′(y1), . . . ,P ′′(yk)) = P(x)] > 1− ǫ .
Similarly, an adaptive worst-case to average-case reduction is defined by including previous
queries and answers to the arguments of G.
It has been shown that NP-complete problems are not non-adaptive worst-case to average-
case reducible to themselves, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level [BT06].
In addition, the existence of a non-adaptive worst-case to average-case reduction from NP-hard
problem to inverting a one-way function implies that the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the
second level [AGGM06] and the existence of a worst-case to average-case reduction from an NP-
hard problem to inverting a size verifiable one-way function implies that the polynomial hierarchy
collapses to the second level [AGGM06, BB15].
3 Formalizing quantum reductions
In this section we define the quantum analogues of the two classical notions of worst-to-average
reductions (Definition 2.4 and 2.6). We then describe some characterizations and examples that
illustrates diverse features of quantum reductions.
6
Definition 3.1 (non-adaptive locally quantum reduction (G,R)). A decision problem P is non-
adaptive locally quantum reducible to a distributional problem (P ′,D) with error ǫ by using k
queries if there are two polynomial-time implementable unitaries R and G such that for all n and
x ∈ {0, 1}n
• The generator G creates k superposition queries, with query amplitudes based on the distri-
bution D: G|0〉MV |x〉 = |Qx,1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Qx,k〉|x〉 where |Qx,i〉 =
∑
q∈Zm
2
√
dq|q, 0〉M |wx,i(q)〉V
for i ∈ [k]. Note that dq is the probability that q is drawn from Dn and the register V for the
state |wx,i〉 is the work register, which could be in arbitrary state.
• R takes responses of the queries |QHx,1, . . . , QHx,k〉 and decides whether or not P(x) is true:
R|QHx,1, . . . , QHx,k〉 =
√
p|P(x)〉|ψ0x〉+
√
1− p|1− P(x)〉|ψ1x〉
where p ≥ 1− ǫ and |QHx,i〉 =
∑
q∈Zm
2
√
dq|q,P ′(q)〉M |wx,i(q)〉V , for i ∈ [k].
Definition 3.2 (non-adaptive quantum worst-case to average-case reduction). A decision problem
P is non-adaptive quantum worst-case to average-case reducible to (P ′,D) with average hardness
δ and error ǫ if there are polynomial-time computable unitaries R and G such that for any n ∈ N
and x
• The generator G creates k superposition queries:
G|0〉MV |x〉 = |Qx,1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Qx,k〉|x〉, (1)
where |Qx,i〉 =
∑
q∈Zm
2
cx,q,i|q, 0〉M |wx,i(q)〉V , for i ∈ [k]. Note that the coefficients cx,q,i for
q ∈ Zm2 could be any complex numbers such that the sum of absolute squares is 1.
• R: for any P ′′ which is δ-close to P with respect to D,
R|QHx,1, . . . , QHx,k〉 =
√
p|P(x)〉|ψ0x〉+
√
1− p|1−P(x)〉|ψ1x〉, (2)
where p ≥ 1− ǫ and |QHx,i〉 =
∑
q∈Zm
2
cx,q,i|q,P ′′(q)〉M |wx,i(q)〉V , for i ∈ [k].
The variables m and k are polynomial in the input length n.
Compared to locally quantum reductions, quantum worst-case to average-case reductions do
not require the queries to be drawn from a certain distribution. Instead, we consider an oracle for
P ′ that can err sometimes, which is captured by δ-close problems P ′′. 1 − p is called the error of
the reduction. The choice of p = 2/3 is arbitrary, since it can be reduced effectively.
3.1 Separation examples
We give two examples demonstrating the distinct landscapes of classical and quantum worst-case
to average-case reductions. Namely, relative to an oracle and under reasonable computational
assumptions, there exist a worst-case problem and an average-case problem such that no classical
reductions exist whereas they admit an efficient quantum reduction. In fact, the quantum reduction
issues non-adaptive classical queries only. This makes the separation examples strong.
The idea behind the examples is simple. We design the average-case problem in such a way
that to make a meaningful query to a solver for this average-case problem, one has to solve a
problem that is (assumed to be) hard for classical algorithms but easy on a quantum computer.
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Our first example is based on a oracle problem provably hard classically (Simon’s Problem), and
the quantum reduction needs quantum access to the oracle. The second example needs to assume
the existence of problem in BQP that is outside BPP (e.g., factorization). However we remove
the need of quantum access to the oracle as a reward. Both constructions rely on the following
assumption.
Assumption 1. There exists language L /∈ BQP (hence L /∈ BPP too) that admits a random
self-reduction L ≤(R,G) (L,D) for some distribution D.
A candidate is the PSPACE-complete problem TQBF, which is known to have a non-adaptive
random self-reduction [FF93]. Assumption 1 will follow, if BQP ( PSPACE. Hereafter we treat G
as non-adaptive in Assumption 1 for simplicity.
Let N = 2n, and for each i ∈ [N ], let fi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be some function, and si ∈ {0, 1}n.
We define an oracle O := Os0,...,sN−1 that generalizes Simon’s oracle [Sim97].
O : |i, x, y, z〉 → |i, x, y ⊕ fi(x), z〉 ; where fi(x) = fi(x′) iff. x′ = x⊕ si .
We assume that all si, i ∈ [N ] are chose uniformly at random. As an immediate corollary of Simon’s
result. We have that
Lemma 3.3. Given O, any classical algorithms needs Ω(2n/2) queries to O to find si for some
i ∈ [N ]. For any i ∈ [N ], there is a quantum algorithm that can find si with O(n2) queries and
time.
Construction 1. We construct our first separation example.
• L1 = TQBF = {φ = φ(v1, . . . , vn)} containing satisfiable quantified n-variable formulae in
3-CNF. Let LO1 be the language L1 relative to oracle O, which simply ignores O.
• LˆO1 := {x = (i, s, φ) : s = si and φ is true}. We associate LˆO1 a distribution Dˆ1, which is
uniform on N × {0, 1}n and samples a formula according to D (the distribution in Assump-
tion 1).
Theorem 3.4. Under Assumption 1, there does not exist a PPT reduction from LO1 to (Lˆ
O
1 , Dˆ1).
In contrast, there is a quantum poly-time non-adaptive reduction LO1 ≤RQ
1
,GQ
1
(LˆO1 , Dˆ1).
Proof. Let A be an algorithm that solves the average-case problem (LˆO1 , Dˆ1). For simplicity, we
assume that A is a perfect decider, i.e., for a random input x = (i, s, φ) ← Dˆ1, A(i, s, φ) = 1 iff.
s = si and φ = 1. Any classical reduction is unable to find si in polynomial time, hence the solver
A is useless. Formally speaking, if there were such a reduction LO1 ≤ (LˆO1 , Dˆ1), one can turn it into
an efficient solver for Simon’s problem or an efficient decider for L. This violates Lemma 3.3 or
Assumption 1.
For the second part, we construct a quantum reduction (RQ1 , G
Q
1 ) as follows. Recall that there
is a random self-reduction L ≤(R,G) (L,D). Given a worst-case input φ, GQ1 (φ) runs G(φ) to
get random {φj}kj=1. Then for j = 1, . . . k, GQ1 generates random ij ← [N ], and runs Simon’s
algorithm to find sij efficiently. Then the queries to A are {ij , sij , φj}kj=1, which are correctly
distributed according to Dˆ1. Therefore A will respond correctly with {φj ?= 1}. Then RQ1 runs the
decision procedure R, which correctly decides φ.
Remark 1. We have designed O to encode exponentially many instances of Simon’s problem for
the technicality of non-uniform reductions. Because otherwise, a classical reduction could hardwire
the solution s and make use of an average-case solver.
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Construction 2. We give another separation example. It is still in the oracle setting, and we need
to make an additional assumption. What we gain is that the quantum reduction does not need
quantum access to the oracle, as opposed to Example 1 where we need to run Simon’s algorithm
with quantum access to the oracle.
Assumption 2. There exists a classically secure one-way function f : X → Y , which is invertible
by an efficient quantum algorithm.
A natural candidate would be adaption of Factorization. Let (p, q)← Gen(1n) be an efficient
algorithm that generates two large primes at random, and define f(p, q) = pq. Then it is reasonable
to assume that there exists a Gen algorithm relative to which f is hard to invert. In fact this is
necessary for the RSA assumption, which is the basis of modern public-key cryptography. This
assumption is hence likely to be true given the current state of art.
Given a function f as in Assumption 2, we define an oracle H : i 7→ yi for i ∈ [N ]. Here we
sample zi ← X randomly and set yi := f(zi).
• L2 = TQBF = {φ = φ(v1, . . . , vn)} containing satisfiable quantified n-variable formulae in
3-CNF. Let LO2 be the language L relative to oracle H, which ignores H.
• LˆH2 := {x = (i, z, φ) : f(z) = yi and φ is true}. We associate LˆH2 a distribution Dˆ2, which is
uniform on [N ]×X and samples a formula according to D (the distribution in Assumption 1).
Remark 2. For the same reason as above, we introduce the oracle H to encode superpolynomial-
many instances of inverting f to avoid a non-uniform classical reduction that can hardwire solutions
to (at most poly-many) inversion instances.
Following similar arguments to Theorem 3.4, we can prove the theorem below. The only change
is that in the quantum reduction, we query classically a random index ij to H, and obtain yij .
Then we run Shor’s algorithm to find zij := f
−1(yij ), and then form correct queries to the solver
of (LˆH2 , Dˆ2).
Theorem 3.5. Under Assumption 1 and 2, there does not exist a classical reduction from LH2 to
(LˆH2 , Dˆ2). In contrast, there is a quantum poly-time non-adaptive reduction L
H
2 ≤RQ
2
,GQ
2
(LˆH2 , Dˆ2).
3.2 Discussion of the definitions: special cases
3.2.1 Classical queries.
If G outputs classical queries, then we can immediately derive a negative result, analogous to a
classical result by Brassard [Bra79]. In the following, L <R,G P ′ denotes a non-adaptive quantum
reduction from L to P ′, where G generates oracle queries and R decides L according to the oracle’s
responses. We will add more constraints to the reductions accordingly in this section.
Theorem 3.6. If there is a non-adaptive quantum reduction L ≤R,G Inv-OWP where G only issues
classical queries, then L ∈ QIP(2) with classical interactions.
Proof. The protocol is as follows: The verifier first applies G to generate queries and sends these
queries to the prover. Then, the prover simulates the oracle for Inv-OWP and sends the responses
back. Finally, the verifier checks if the responses are correct by computing the permutation. If the
prover is not cheating, the verifier applies R and accepts if the reduction accepts. Otherwise, the
verifier rejects. Note that the prover can only give the correct answer for Inv-OWP. Otherwise, the
verifier rejects.
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3.2.2 EPR queries.
As another special case, we consider that wx,i(q) is the identity function in Definition 3.1. Namely
G generates k identical copies of |Ψ〉⊗m = ∑q |q〉|q〉, where Ψ = 1√2(|00〉 + |11〉) is an EPR-pair.
Then half of the EPR-pairs are submitted as queries to the solver of the average-case problem.
Note the reduced density of each query is totally mixed, and this looks a natural generalization of
classical uniform queries. Nonetheless, we show that this is too strong a constraint that trivializes
the study of worst-to-average reductions, as far as OWP is concerned.
Proposition 3.7. If there is a reduction L ≤R,G Inv-OWP where G issues EPR-queries, then L ∈
BQP.
Proof. Observe that a uniform superposition over a set is invariant under an arbitrary permutation.
This means that a quantum reduction could create the correct state that otherwise would require
invoking an inverting oracle I of the OWP f . Namely applying I on an EPR query gives us
∑
q
|q, q〉 I7→
∑
q
|q, q, f−1(q)〉 .
This can be created without help of I as follows:
|0, 0, 0〉 7→
∑
q
|q, 0, 0〉 f7→
∑
q
|q, f(q), f(q)〉 =
∑
q′
|f−1(q′), q′, q′〉
SWAP1,37→
∑
q′
|q′, q′, f−1(q′)〉 .
Remark 3. Consequently, it is necessary that the query states maintain more sophisticated cor-
relations between the query register and the work register of the reduction. We note the same
phenomenon also occur classically. Namely, although the marginal distribution of each query is
uniformly random, it is important that the internal state of the reduction should not be indepen-
dent of the queries. Otherwise, existence of such a reduction will trivialize the language under
consideration to fall in BPP.
4 On uniform locally quantum reductions
We prove our main result in this section. We first consider quantum reductions that make one-query
only. It demonstrates the main idea of our general result with a cleaner analysis. Section 4.2 will
handle multiple non-adaptive queries.
4.1 Uniform one-query locally quantum reductions
Let f be a one-way permutation on {0, 1}n, and let Uf : |x, y〉 7→ |x, y⊕f(x)〉 be a unitary quantum
circuit computing it. Note that Uf |f−1(x), 0〉 = |f−1(x), x〉. A uniform one-query locally quantum
reduction for L works as follows:
|x, 0〉|0〉 G−→ 1√
2m
∑
q∈Zm
2
|q, 0〉|wx(q)〉 (3)
Of−1−→ 1√
2m
∑
q∈Zm
2
|q, f−1(q)〉|wx(q)〉 R−→ a0|0〉|ψx,0〉+ a1|1〉|ψx,1〉, (4)
10
where |a1|2 ≥ 1− ǫ if x ∈ L and |a1|2 ≤ ǫ if x /∈ L is the accepting probability of the reduction.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose there exists a one-query uniform locally quantum reduction with exponen-
tially small error ǫ from a worst-case decision problem L to the task of inverting a polynomial-time
computable permutation. Then there exists a QIP (2) protocol with completeness 1−ǫ/2 and sound-
ness 1/2 + 2
√
ǫ for L
4.1.1 The protocol for L.
We are given the uniform one-query locally quantum reduction (G,R). We enlarge the size of
register V and define a unitary C which performs a CNOT on the first register of M into the
second register of V : |q, x〉M |y, z〉V C−→ |q, x〉M |y, z ⊕ q〉V . The whole protocol takes place in the
space HP⊗HM⊗HV ⊗HΠ where P is the private register of the prover,M is the register exchanged
between the prover and the verifier, V and Π are registers which are private to the verifier.
We describe some states that are crucial in the protocol.
• The verifier prepares the state |S〉MV Π = 1√2(|Q〉MV |0〉Π + |T 〉MV |1〉Π), where
|Q〉MV = 1√
2n
∑
q∈Zm
2
|q, 0〉M |wx(q), q〉V (5)
without the extra copy of q in the register V is the query state generated from G as in
Equation 3, and
|T 〉MV = 1√
2n
∑
q∈Zm
2
|q, 0〉M |0, q〉V (6)
is the trap state, which will be used to catch a cheating prover.
• The honest prover replies |SH〉MV Π = 1√2 (|QH〉MV |0〉Π + |TH〉MV |1〉Π), where
|QH〉MV = 1√
2n
∑
q∈Zm
2
|q, f−1(q)〉M |wx(q), q〉V (7)
|TH〉MV = 1√
2n
∑
q∈Zm
2
|q, f−1(q)〉M |0, q〉V . (8)
The state |QH〉 without the extra copy of q in register V is the state the actual reduction
R gets after querying the oracle as in Equation 4. The state |TH〉 can be mapped to |0〉MV
efficiently as shown below. This gives the verifier an efficient way to check if |TH〉 is changed
significantly.
We do the following to map |TH〉MV back to |0〉MV efficiently∑
q∈Zm
2
|q, f−1(q)〉M |0, q〉V C−→
∑
q
|q, f−1(q)〉M |0, q ⊕ q〉V
Uf−−→
∑
q
|q ⊕ f(f−1(q)), f−1(q)〉M |0, 0〉V F−→ |0, 0〉M |0, 0〉V .
Here Uf is applied from the second register of M into the first, and f is applied to the second
register of M . The last two steps use the property that f can be evaluated efficiently and f is a
permutation.
Given the reduction (G,R), we can get a QIP(2) protocol for L by answering the same as R
and a protocol for L by flipping R’s answer. The QIP(2) protocol for L is described in Protocol 1.
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Protocol 1 QIP(2) protocol for L using a one-query locally quantum reduction.
The protocol takes place in the space HP ⊗HM ⊗HV ⊗HΠ where P is the private register of
the prover, M is the register exchanged between the prover and the verifier, and V and Π are
registers which are private to the verifier.
1. The verifier’s query. The verifier prepares |S〉MV Π := 1√2(|Q〉MV |0〉Π + |T 〉MV |1〉Π).
The message register M is sent to the prover, and the verifier keeps V and Π. This is
generated by conditioning on the register Π, which is initialized in |+〉. If Π = 0, G is
applied and then q is copied to the second part of the verifier’s internal register V , which
produces |Q〉MV . If Π = 1, compute the Fourier transform followed by CNOT to create
|T 〉MV , a trap state we use to catch a cheating prover.
2. The prover’s response. The prover applies some unitary UPM on register M and its
private register P and sends the message register back to the verifier.
3. The verifier’s verification. The verifier applies C to erase q in V . The verifier then
measures Π to obtain b ∈ {0, 1}, and does the following:
• (Computation verification) If b = 0, apply R on MV and measure the output qubit.
Accept if the outcome is 0.
• (Trap verification) If b = 1, apply VT on MV and measure MV . Accept if the
outcome is all 0, (i.e., if the reduction rejects).
4.1.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1.
We first prove a few useful lemmas. Lemma 4.2 is an immediate consequence of the fact two
purifications of the same state are related by an isometry. In fact, this exactly explains why the
entanglement fidelity is well defined [Sch96].
Lemma 4.2. Let ρA be a state in some Hilbert space. Let |φ〉AB and |ψ〉AB be two purifications
of ρA, i.e., TrB(|φ〉〈φ|AB) = TrB(|ψ〉〈ψ|AB) = ρA. Let ΨA : HA → HA be a quantum channel.
Let ρAB := (ΨA ⊗ IB)(|φ〉〈φ|AB) and σAB := (ΨA ⊗ IB)(|ψ〉〈ψ|AB), where the notation ΨA ⊗ IB
means that the channel is only applied on the space HA and space HB is not changed. Then
〈φ|ρAB |φ〉 = 〈ψ|σAB |ψ〉.
Proof. Observe that (e.g., by Schmidt decomposition) there is a unitary UB operating only on B
such that IA ⊗ UB |ψ〉AB = |φ〉AB . Then
〈φ|ρAB |φ〉 = 〈φ|(ΨA ⊗ IB)((|φ〉〈φ|)AB )|φ〉
= 〈ψ|(IA ⊗ U †B)(ΨA ⊗ IB)(IA ⊗ UB(|ψ〉〈ψ|)ABIA ⊗ U †B)(IA ⊗ UB)|ψ〉
=
∑
ℓ
〈ψ|(IA ⊗ U †B)(EℓA ⊗ IB)(IA ⊗ UB(|ψ〉〈ψ|)ABIA ⊗ U †B)
(Eℓ†A ⊗ IB)(IA ⊗ UB)|ψ〉 (9)
=
∑
ℓ
〈ψ|(EℓA ⊗ IB)((|ψ〉〈ψ|)AB )(Eℓ†A ⊗ IB)|ψ〉 (10)
= 〈ψ|(ΨA ⊗ IB)((|ψ〉〈ψ|)AB )|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|σAB |ψ〉.
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The operators {EℓA} in Equation 9 are the operation elements of the channel ΨA, where (ΨA ⊗
IB)((|φ〉〈φ|)AB) =
∑
ℓ(E
ℓ
A ⊗ IB)((|φ〉〈φ|)AB)(Eℓ†A ⊗ IB) and (ΨA ⊗ IB)((|ψ〉〈ψ|)AB ) =
∑
ℓ(E
ℓ
A ⊗
IB)((|ψ〉〈ψ|)AB )(Eℓ†A ⊗ IB). Equation 10 is correct due to the property that (A ⊗ B)(C ⊗ D) =
(AC)⊗ (BD).
Without loss of generality, we can always represent the prover’s operator UPM as U
′
PMOf−1
where U ′PM is an arbitrary unitary the cheating prover may apply. Let
σU
′
Q = TrP (U
′
PM ⊗ IV (|0〉〈0| ⊗ |QH〉〈QH |)U ′†PM ⊗ IV ), and
σU
′
T = TrP (U
′
PM ⊗ IV (|0〉〈0| ⊗ |TH〉〈TH |)U ′†PM ⊗ IV ).
The following claim shows that for any unitaries the prover applies, the change on |TH〉 is as much
as the change on |QH〉.
Lemma 4.3. For an arbitrary U ′PM , let |QH〉MV and |TH〉MV be as defined in Equation 7 and
Equation 8, and let σU
′
Q and σ
U ′
T be as above. Then 〈QH |σU
′
Q |QH〉 = 〈TH |σU
′
T |TH〉.
Proof. We represent the prover’s behavior U ′PM on the state |QH〉 and |TH〉 as a noisy channel ΨU
′
M
operating on register M , which is formally defined as follows:
For all ρ ∈ HP ⊗HM ⊗HV , (ΨU ′M ⊗ IV )(ρ) := TrP ((U ′PM ⊗ IV )ρ(U ′†PM ⊗ IV )).
Therefore,
(ΨU
′
M ⊗ IV )(|QH〉〈QH |) = σU
′
Q (Ψ
U ′
M ⊗ IV )(|TH〉〈TH |) = σU
′
T .
|TH〉 and |QH〉 are actually two purifications of a mixed state on registerM since TrV (|QH〉〈QH |) =
TrV (|TH〉〈TH |), and by Lemma 4.2, we can conclude that
〈QH |σU ′Q |QH〉 = 〈TH |σU
′
T |TH〉.
Given a state |φ〉 and a projector ΠS , Lemma 4.4 shows that the state ρ which maximizes the
quantity Tr(ΠSρ) + 〈φ|ρ|φ〉 is the bisector of |φ〉 and its projection on ΠS .
Lemma 4.4. Let S ⊆ H be a subspace and ΠS be the projection operator on S. Let |φ〉 be a
state such that 〈φ|ΠS |φ〉 = sin2 θ, for some θ ∈ [0, π/2]. Then for any density operator ρ ∈ D(H),
Tr(ΠSρ) + 〈φ|ρ|φ〉 ≤ 1 + sin θ.
Proof. We first prove this lemma for any pure state ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. Let dim(S) = k. Let |v0〉 :=
ΠS |φ〉
‖ΠS |φ〉‖ and |vk〉 :=
|φ〉−|v0〉
‖|φ〉−|v0〉‖ . Clearly, |vk〉 ⊥ |v0〉, and |φ〉 = sin θ|v0〉 + cos θ|vk〉. Then we pick
{|v1〉, . . . , |vk−1〉} in S such that {|v0〉, . . . , |vk−1〉} form an orthonormal basis for S. As a result,
{|v0〉, . . . , |vk〉} will be an orthonormal basis for S˜ := span(S ∪ |φ〉). Consider any ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| with
|ψ〉 ∈ S˜. Then |ψ〉 can be written as
|ψ〉 =
k∑
i=0
αi|vi〉,
∑
i
|αi|2 = 1 . (11)
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We have that
〈φ|(|ψ〉〈ψ|)|φ〉 = |α0 sin θ + αk cos θ|2 = |α0|2 sin2 θ + |αk|2 cos2 θ
+sin θ cos θ(α0α
∗
k + α
∗
0αk) ;
Tr(ΠS |ψ〉〈ψ|) =
k−1∑
i=0
|αi|2 = 1− |αk|2 .
Therefore
Tr(ΠS |ψ〉〈ψ|) + 〈φ|(|ψ〉〈ψ|)|φ〉 (12)
= 1 + sin2 θ|α0|2 + (cos2 θ − 1)|αk|2 + sin θ cos θ(α0α∗k + α∗0αk)
= 1 + sin θ · (sin θ(|α0|2 − |αk|2) + cos θ(α0α∗k + α∗0αk)
)
≤ 1 + sin θ · (sin θ(|α0|2 − |αk|2) + 2 cos θ(|α0||αk|)). (13)
Since the expression in Equation 13 is strictly increasing with |α0| and independent to |α1|, . . . |αk−1|,
we can suppose the optimal |ψ〉 for Equation 12 is on the subspace spanned by |v0〉 and |vk〉 without
loss of generality. Thus we let |α0| = cos θ0 and |αk| = sin θ0 and the upper bound for Equation 13
as below
1 + sin θ · (sin θ(|α0|2 − |αk|2) + 2 cos θ(|α0||αk|))
= 1 + sin θ(sin θ(cos2 θ0 − sin2 θ0) + 2 cos θ cos θ0 sin θ0)
= 1 + sin θ(sin θ cos 2θ0 + cos θ sin 2θ0)
= 1 + sin θ(sin(θ + 2θ0)) ≤ 1 + sin θ.
The maximum is achieved when θ0 =
1
2 (π/2− θ), i.e., when |ψ〉 bisects |φ〉 and |v0〉.
For an arbitrary mixed state ρ :=
∑
i pi|ψi〉〈ψi| with
∑
i pi = 1, pi ≥ 0.
Tr(ΠSρ) + 〈φ|ρ|φ〉 =
∑
i
pi (Tr(ΠS |ψi〉〈ψi|) + 〈φ|(|ψi〉〈ψi|) |φ〉) ≤ 1 + sin θ .
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The intuition behind the soundness proof is that the two branches (con-
ditioning on register Π) of verifier’s verification are competing and the prover cannot cheat one
without also changing the other. When the input x /∈ L, a cheating prover must apply an opera-
tion far from Of−1 on |Q〉 to make R accept. We will show that when it applies such an operation,
it must move the trap state |T 〉 far from the correct state |TH〉 which will be detected by the
verifier. Now, we can finish the proof by showing the completeness and soundness.
We introduce some notation first. Let the state of the entire system after the prover’s action
be 1√
2
(|ψ0〉PMV |0〉B + |ψ1〉PMV |1〉B) .
If the prover is honest, then |ψ0〉 = |0〉P |QH〉, |ψ1〉 = |0〉P |TH〉.
If the prover is dishonest, we can always assume that Of−1 is applied honestly, followed by an
arbitrary unitary U˜ on its work register P and message register M . In this case
|ψ0〉 = U˜ ⊗ IV (|0〉P |QH〉MV ), |ψ1〉 = U˜ ⊗ IV (|0〉P |TH〉MV ) .
For ease of notation, define ρ0 := TrP (|ψ0〉〈ψ0|PMV ) and ρ1 := TrP (|ψ1〉〈ψ1|PMV ).
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Let ΠR be the projection to the acceptance subspace Sacc ⊆ HM ⊗HV induced by R. Observe
that the verifier accepts with probability
psucc :=
1
2
(p0 + p1) , where p0 = Tr(ΠRρ0) , p1 = 〈TH |ρ1|TH〉 .
Completeness. If x ∈ L¯, then ρ0 = |QH〉〈QH | and ρ1 = |TH〉〈TH |. Therefore, p0 = Tr(ΠRρ0) ≥
1 − ε by our hypothesis on the reduction. Meanwhile p1 = 〈TH |ρ1|TH〉 = 1. Therefore psucc =
1
2(p0 + p1) ≥ 1− ε/2.
Soundness. Suppose that x /∈ L¯. By Lemma 4.3, we have that p1 = 〈TH |ρ1|TH〉 = 〈QH |ρ0|QH〉.
Therefore psucc =
1
2(p0+ p1) =
1
2(Tr(ΠRρ0)+ 〈QH |ρ0|QH〉) . Since x /∈ L¯, we know that RC|QH〉 =√
δ|0〉|φx,0〉 +
√
1− δ|1〉|φx,1〉 with δ ≤ ε. Therefore, 〈QH |ΠR|QH〉 ≤ ε, i.e., |QH〉 is almost or-
thogonal to the acceptance subspace Sacc. Then from the prover’s perspective, to maximize the
verifier’s accepting probability, it needs to find a state whose projection on |QH〉 and Sacc combined
is maximized. By Lemma 4.4, the maximum is achieved by a state bisecting |QH〉 and its projection
on Sacc, and we conclude that psucc =
1
2(Tr(ΠRρ0) + 〈QH |ρ0|QH〉) ≤ 12(1 +
√
ε).
Let L be a hard problem in NP or QMA, we derive the following corollaries from Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.5. If there exists a uniform one-query locally quantum reduction from a worst-case
NP-hard decision problem to inverting a one-way permutation, then coNP ⊆ QIP(2).
Proof. Suppose L is NP-hard, and it reduces to Inv-OWP via a uniform one-query quantum locally
random reduction. By Theorem 4.1, L ∈ QIP(2), hence coNP ⊆ QIP(2).
Corollary 4.6. If there exists a uniform one-query locally quantum reduction from a worst-case
promise problem which is QMA-hard to inverting a one-way permutation, then coQMA ⊆ QIP(2)
Proof. Suppose L is QMA-hard and there exists a uniform one-query quantum locally random
reduction from L to Inv-OWP. By Theorem 4.1, L ∈ QIP(2). This implies coQMA ⊆ QIP(2).
4.2 Uniform non-adaptive locally quantum reductions
In this section, we are going to generalize Theorem 4.1 such that the existence of a multi-query
uniform non-adaptive locally quantum reduction with constant error implies coNP⊆QIP(2).
Let f be a one-way permutation, and let Uf be a circuit computing it. A uniform non-adaptive
locally quantum reduction (G,R) from a decision problem to the task of inverting f is defined as:
|x, 0〉 G−→ 1√
2mk
∑
q1,...,qk∈Zm2
|q1, 0, wx,1(q1)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |qk, 0, wx,k(qk)〉
Of−1−→ 1√
2mk
∑
q1,...,qk∈Zm2
|q1, f−1(q1), wx,1(q1)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |qk, f−1(qk), wx,k(qk)〉
R−→ a0|0〉|ψx,0〉+ a1|1〉|ψx,1〉,
where |a1|2 ≥ 2/3 if x ∈ L and |a1|2 ≤ 1/3 if x /∈ L is the probability the reduction accepts.
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Theorem 4.7. Suppose there exists a uniform non-adaptive locally quantum reduction (G,R)
from a worst-case decision problem L to Inv-OWP. Then, there exists a QIP (2) protocol with
completeness 1− ǫ/2 and soundness 1/2 + 2√ǫ for L, where ǫ is negligible.
Before giving the main theorem, we first show that the error of locally quantum reductions and
quantum worst-case to average-case reductions can be reduced by parallel repetition.
Lemma 4.8 (Error reduction). The error of locally quantum reductions and quantum worst-case
to average-case reductions can be reduced to an exponential small parameter ǫ in polynomial time
and polynomial number of queries.
Proof. The error of both reductions can be reduced by parallel repetition. The new reduction
(R′, G′) is described as follows:
1. G′ operates G t times to generate t copies of |Qx,1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Qx,k〉 and send all copies to the
oracle in parallel, where t is polynomial in the input length n.
2. After getting all t responses |QHx,1, . . . , QHx,k〉 from the oracle, R′ operates R t times and make
the majority vote. If more than t/2 copies are accepted, R′ accepts; otherwise, R′ rejects.
For completeness, the probability that (G′, R′) rejects is
∑
u< t
2
( t
u
)
2
3
u
(1− 23)t−u. For soundness,
the probability that (G′, R′) accepts is
∑
u> t
2
( t
u
)
1
3
u
(1− 13)t−u. Both are negligible. This completes
the proof.
Then we will show that such reduction does not exist unless coNP ⊆ QIP(2).
Proof of Theorem 4.7. The error can be reduced to an exponentially small parameter ǫ by applying
Lemma 4.8. The idea of the protocol for multiple queries is the same as the protocol in Protocol 1
for one query. The verifier generates a superposition of the query state and the trap state and sends
part of the state to the prover. In the following, we will give a QIP(2) protocol which is similar to
the protocol in Protocol 1 for L.
By Lemma 4.8, the error of a quantum locally random (G,R) can be reduced to an exponentially
small parameter ǫ by parallel repetition, where we suppose G is operated t times and each time it
generates k queries. We denote the new reduction as (G′, R′).
We now introduce the query state and the trap state the verifier generates. By applying G′ and
C, the verifier generates |Q1,1〉|Q1,2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Qt,k〉, where
|Qi,j〉 = 1√
2m
∑
q∈Zm
2
|q, 0〉|wx,j(q), q〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Note that i indicates the i-th copy generated from the parallel repetition in Lemma 4.8. Also, the
verifier generates |T 〉⊗tk, where |T 〉 is defined in Equation 6.
Then, we rearrange the qubits such that the first two registers of all |Qi,j〉 and |T 〉 are moved
to the beginning in sequence as follows:
|Q1,1, . . . , Qt,k〉 → |Qˆ〉MV = 1
2mkt/2
∑
qˆ∈Zmkt
2
|qˆ, 0〉M |wx(qˆ), qˆ〉V (14)
|T 〉⊗k → |Tˆ 〉MV = 1
2mkt/2
∑
qˆ∈Zmkt
2
|qˆ, 0〉M |0, qˆ〉V . (15)
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where qˆ = [q1,1, . . . , q1,k, . . . , qt,1, . . . , qt,k] and wx(qˆ) = [wx,1(q1,1), . . . , wx,k(qt,k)]. For example, given
a state of two queries
∑
q,q′ |q, 0〉|wx,1(q), q〉|q′, 0〉|wx,2(q), q′〉, following the rearrangement, we rep-
resent it as
∑
q,q′ |qq′, 0〉|wx,1(q)wx,2(q′), qq′〉.
Similarly, we define
|QˆH〉MV = 1
2mkt/2
∑
qˆ∈Zmkt
2
|qˆ, f−1(qˆ)〉M |wx(qˆ), qˆ〉V
|TˆH〉MV = 1
2mkt/2
∑
qˆ∈Zmkt
2
|qˆ, f−1(qˆ)〉M |0, qˆ〉V ,
where f−1(qˆ) = (f−1(q1,1), . . . , f−1(qt,k)).
Protocol 2 QIP(2) protocol for L using a non-adaptive locally quantum reduction.
The protocol takes place in the space HP ⊗HM ⊗HV ⊗HΠ where P is the private register of
the prover, M is the register exchanged between the prover and the verifier, and V and Π are
registers which are private to the verifier.
1. The verifier’s query. The verifier prepares the state below. The message register M is
sent to the prover.
|Sˆ〉MV Π := 1√
2
(|Qˆ〉MV |0〉Π + |Tˆ 〉MV |1〉Π).
2. The prover’s response. The prover applies some unitary UPM on register M and its
private register P and sends the message register back to the verifier.
3. The verifier’s verification. The verifier applies C to erase qˆ in V . The verifier then
measures Π to obtain b ∈ {0, 1}, and does the following:
• (Computation verification) If b = 0, apply R′ onMV and measure the output qubit.
Accept if the outcome is 0.
• (Trap verification) If b = 1, apply VT on each |T 〉 in MV and measure MV . Accept
if the outcome is the all 0 string.
The QIP(2) protocol for L is shown in Protocol 2. Note that the prover’s behavior UPM can be
represented as U ′PMOf−1 where U
′
PM is an arbitrary unitary a cheating prover may apply. In the
following, we show that the protocol in Protocol 2 is a QIP(2) protocol for L .
For the completeness condition, when x ∈ L, the verifier accepts with probability ≥ 1− ǫ/2 via
the same calculation in Section 4.1.
For the soundness condition, assume x /∈ L. Let
σˆU
′
Q = TrP (U
′
PM ⊗ IV (|0〉〈0| ⊗ |QˆH〉〈QˆH |)U ′†PM ⊗ IV )
σˆU
′
T = TrP (U
′
PM ⊗ IV (|0〉〈0| ⊗ |TˆH〉〈TˆH |)U ′†PM ⊗ IV ).
Since |TˆH〉 and |QˆH〉 are two purifications of the mixed state TrV (|QˆH〉〈QˆH |) on register M ,
〈QˆH |σˆU ′Q |QˆH〉 = 〈TˆH |σˆU
′
T |TˆH〉 (16)
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by Lemma 4.2. Then, we do a similar calculation as in the proof of soundness for Theorem 4.1,
which gives an upper bound 1/2 +
√
ǫ on the probability that the verifier accepts.
The following two corollaries follow from Theorem 4.7, which proofs are the same as the proof
for Corollary 4.5 and Corollary 4.6.
Corollary 4.9. If there exists a uniform non-adaptive quantum locally random reduction from a
worst-case decision problem which is NP-hard to the task of inverting a one-way permutation, then
coNP ⊆ QIP(2).
Corollary 4.10. If there exists a uniform non-adaptive quantum locally random reduction from
a worst-case promise problem which is QMA-hard to the task of inverting a one-way permutation,
then coQMA ⊆ QIP(2).
5 Generalizations
In this section, we will show that we can generalize our techniques to other settings. We will first
see that we can deal with distributions which are not uniform but close to uniform. Then, we
will show that in addition to locally quantum reduction, we can also handle the case of quantum
worst-case to average-case reduction when the queries are “smooth”. Finally, we will consider the
task of inverting a regular one-way function and will show that when the oracle can do a quantum
sampling of the preimages, then the same theorem for Inv-OWP also holds for Inv-OWF.
5.1 Smooth locally quantum reductions to Inv-OWP
We first show that when the distribution is not far from uniform distribution, we can still construct
a QIP(2) protocol given the non-adaptive quantum locally reduction. Therefore, the existence of
such reduction also imply coNP ⊆ QIP(2).
The difficulty to apply Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 to non-uniform distributions is that we do
not know how to construct a trap state that can be mapped to |0〉 efficiently and has the state
in the message register be indistinguishable from the actual query state. Here we show that if
the distribution is smooth-computable, then the verifier can use the same trap state by applying
quantum rejection sampling [ORR13] to prevent the prover from cheating.
Definition 5.1 (Smooth-computable distributions). A distribution D = {Dn : n ∈ N} is said
to be smooth-computable if it satisfies the following properties. Let dq = Pr[q ∼ Dn], dmin,n =
minq∈{0,1}n dq and dmax,n = maxq∈{0,1}ndq.
1. For n ∈ N, for all q where |q| = n, the function fn : fn(q) = dq is polynomial-time computable.
2. For n ∈ N, 2ndmin,n ≥ 1poly(n) and 2ndmax,n ≤ poly(n).
Loosely speaking, smooth-computable distributions are point-wise close to the uniform distri-
bution. It is worth noting that Protocol 2 can handle those that have negligible statistical distance
to the uniform distribution. However, there exists some smooth-computable distribution that has
inverse-polynomial distance from the uniform distribution. In such cases, it is unclear if soundness
still holds in Protocol 2.
Again, we start with the special case of one-query reductions with negligible error. Generalizing
to multiple non-adaptive queries is similar to the case of uniform distributions.
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Let f be a one-way permutation on {0, 1}n, and let Uf be a quantum circuit computing it.
A smooth one-query locally quantum reduction according to a smooth-computable distribution
D = {Dn : n ∈ N} proceeds as follows:
|x, 0〉|0〉 G−→ 1√
2m
∑
q∈Zm
2
√
dq|q, 0〉|wx(q)〉 (17)
Of−1−→ 1√
2m
∑
q∈Zm
2
√
dq|q, f−1(q)〉|wx(q)〉 (18)
R−→ a0|0〉|ψx,0〉+ a1|1〉|ψx,1〉, (19)
where |a1|2 ≥ 1 − ǫ if x ∈ L and |a1|2 ≤ ǫ if x /∈ L is the probability the reduction accepts and dq
is the probability q is drawn from Dn for n = |q|.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose there exists a one-query smooth locally quantum reduction with exponen-
tially small error ǫ from a worst-case decision problem L to the task of inverting a polynomial-time
computable permutation. Then there exists a QIP (2) protocol with completeness 1−ǫ/2 and sound-
ness 1/2 + 2
√
ǫ for L
The proof of Theorem 5.2 relies on the quantum rejection sampling technique in [ORR13]. We
give the definition of the quantum rejection sampling problem and we adapt their tools in the
Lemma 5.4.
Definition 5.3 (Quantum rejection sampling problem QRSP (D,D′, n)). Given an oracle OD :
|0〉 →∑2nx=1
√
dx|ξx〉|x〉 as a unitary, where dx ∼ Dn and |ξx〉 are some unknown fixed states. The
Quantum rejection sampling problem is to prepare the state
∑2n
x=1
√
d′x|ξx〉|x〉 for d′x ∼ D′n.
Lemma 5.4. Let D = {Dn : n ∈ N} be a smooth-computable distribution and U be the uni-
form distribution. There exists a quantum polynomial-time algorithm QRSampling(D → U) that
takes γ = (⌈ 12ndmin,n ⌉)2 copies of
∑2n
x=1
√
dx|ξx〉|x〉 and outputs a state that has negligible trace dis-
tance δ to
∑2n
x=1
√
1
2n |ξx〉|x〉. Similarly QRSampling(U → D) takes γ′ = (⌈2ndmax,n⌉)2 copies of∑2n
x=1
√
1
2n |ξx〉|x〉 and outputs a state that has negligible trace distance δ′ to
∑2n
x=1
√
dx|ξx〉|x〉.
Note that γ and γ′ are polynomial in n when D is smooth according to Definition 5.1.
Proof. We first show the sample complexity. It has been shown in [ORR13] that Algorithm 3
can solve the QRSP (D,D′, k) exactly with 1 − e−β with β2 samples generated from OD for 1β =
minxdx/d
′
x. In case D = U , we have 1β = minx 12ndx = 12ndmax,n . In case D′ = U , we have
1
β = 2
ndmin,n.
Algorithm 3 can also be done in polynomial time. Consider the case where D′ = U . The Step
2 in Algorithm 3 can be viewed as a control rotation on the first and the third register.
S =
2n∑
i=1
1
di


√
di − 12nγ −
√
1
2nγ√
1
2nγ
√
di − 12nγ

⊗ I ⊗ |i〉〈i|
By Solovay-Kitaev theorem, any known one-qubit unitary V can be approximated by V ′ which is
implemented by polynomial number of gates from a finite universal gate set with an exponentially
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Algorithm 3 QRSampling(D → D′)
1: Let 1β = minx
dx
d′x
.
2: Apply OD to generate
∑2n
x=1
√
di|ξi〉|i〉.
3: Pick ~α ∈ R2n+ where αi = d
′
i
β and rotate the state in the first register by S
S : |0〉(
2n∑
x=1
√
di|ξi〉|i〉)→
2n∑
x=1
(
√
di − αi|0〉 +√αi|1〉)|ξi〉|i〉.
4: Measure the first qubit, which gives
∑2n
i=1
√
d′i|ξi〉|i〉 with probability 1β .
5: By repeating steps 2 to 4 Θ(β2) times, one can prepare the state
∑2n
i=1
√
d′i|ξi〉|i〉 with proba-
bility 1− e−β .
small error δ = max|ψ〉‖(V − V ′)|ψ〉‖. Since D and U are polynomial-time computable as in
Definition 5.1, we can approximate S in polynomial time. This completes the proof. The analysis
for the case where D = U is the same.
In the following, we first give a new protocol Protocol 4 in Section 5.1.1 and then prove that
the protocol is a QIP(2)protocol.
5.1.1 The new protocol for L using quantum rejection sampling.
We first describe some states which are used in the protocol.
|QD〉MV = 1√
2n
∑
q∈Zm
2
√
dq|q, 0〉M |wx(q), q〉V , (20)
where |QD〉MV without the copy of q in V is the query state generated from G as in Equation 17.
|QHD 〉MV =
1√
2n
∑
q∈Zm
2
√
dq|q, f−1(q)〉M |wx(q), q〉V , (21)
where |QHD 〉 without the extra copy q in register V is the state the actual reduction R gets after
querying the oracle as in Equation 19.
By applying QRSampling(D → U), one can prepare the state |Q˜〉 from |QD〉MV such that
D(|Q˜〉, |Q〉) ≤ δ, where δ is an exponentially small error. We also define |Q˜H〉 := Of−1 |Q˜〉. Similarly,
one can prepare the state |Q˜HD 〉 from |Q˜H〉 by QRSampling(U → D) such that D(|Q˜HD 〉, |QHD 〉) ≤ δ′,
where δ′ is exponentially small.
We give Protocol 4 for L with non-adaptive smooth locally quantum reductions and proves
Theorem 5.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let the state of the entire system after the prover’s action be
1√
2
(|ψ˜〉PM1...Mγ′V1...Vγ′ |0〉B + |φ〉PM1...Mγ′V1...Vγ′ |1〉B) .
To simplify the notation, we let M = M1M2 . . .Mγ′ and V = V1V2 . . . Vγ′ . If the prover is honest,
then
|ψ˜〉 = |0〉P |Q˜H〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Q˜H〉, |φ〉 = |0〉P |TH〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |TH〉 ,
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where F (|Q˜H〉, |QH〉) ≥ 1 − δ according to Lemma 5.4. If the prover is dishonest, we can always
assume that the prover first applies Of−1 honestly and then applies an arbitrary unitary U˜ on its
work register P and message register M . In this case
|ψ˜〉 = U˜PM ⊗ IV (|0〉P |Q˜H〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Q˜H〉), |φ〉 = U˜PM ⊗ IV (|TH〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |TH〉) .
For ease of notation, we define
ρ˜0 := TrP (|ψ˜〉〈ψ˜|); ρ1 := TrP (|φ〉〈φ|) .
Let ΠR be the projection to the acceptance subspace Sacc ⊆ HM ⊗HV induced by the verifier’s
verification. Observe that the verifier accepts with probability
psucc :=
1
2
(p0 + p1) , where p0 = Tr(ΠRρ˜0) , p1 = 〈TH |⊗γ′ρ1|TH〉⊗γ′ .
Completeness. If x ∈ L¯, then ρ˜0 = |Q˜H〉〈Q˜H | and ρ1 = |TH〉〈TH |. Therefore, p0 = Tr(ΠRρ˜0) ≥
1 − ε − 2δ where ǫ is from our hypothesis on the reduction and δ is the error from the quantum
rejection sampling. Meanwhile p1 = 〈TH |ρ1|TH〉 = 1. Therefore psucc = 12(p0+p1) ≥ 1−(ε+2δ)/2.
Soundness. Suppose that x /∈ L¯. Let |ψ〉 = U˜PM ⊗ IV (|0〉P |QH〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |QH〉) and ρ0 :=
TrP (|ψ〉〈ψ|). By Lemma 4.3, we have that
〈TH |⊗γ′ρ1|TH〉⊗γ′ = 〈QH |⊗γ′ρ0|QH〉⊗γ′ ,
and then we are going to show that 〈TH |⊗γ′ρ1|TH〉⊗γ′ is close to 〈QH |⊗γ′ ρ˜0|QH〉⊗γ′ except for a
exponentially small error.
First, by monotonicity of the fidelity, F (ρ0, ρ˜0) ≥ F (|QH〉, |Q˜H〉) ≥ 1 − δ. Then we define the
angles between states |QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0 and ρ˜0 as
A(|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0) = arccosF (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0), A(ρ˜0, ρ0) = arccosF (ρ˜0, ρ0), and
A(|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ˜0) = arccosF (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ˜0).
By the triangular inequality,
A(|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ˜0) ≤ A(|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0) +A(ρ˜0, ρ0).
This gives
F (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ˜0) ≥ cos (A(|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0) +A(ρ˜0, ρ0))
= F (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0)F (ρ˜0, ρ0)−
√
1− F (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0)
√
1− F (ρ˜0, ρ0)
≥ F (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0)− 2
√
δ.
We can also get an upper bound on F (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ˜0) as follows: By triangular inequality,
A(|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ˜0) ≥ A(|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0)−A(ρ˜0, ρ0),
which implies
F (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ˜0) ≤ cos (A(|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0)−A(ρ˜0, ρ0))
= F (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0)F (ρ˜0, ρ0) +
√
1− F (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0)
√
1− F (ρ˜0, ρ0)
≤ F (|QH〉⊗γ′ , ρ0) +
√
δ.
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We can conclude that
〈QH |⊗γ′ ρ˜0|QH〉⊗γ′ = 〈QH |⊗γ′ρ1|QH〉⊗γ′ + c
√
δ = 〈TH |⊗γ′ρ1|TH〉⊗γ′ + c
√
δ
for c a small constant. Therefore
psucc =
1
2
(p0 + p1) =
1
2
(Tr(ΠRρ˜0) + 〈QH |⊗γ′ ρ˜0|QH〉⊗γ′ + c
√
δ) .
By Lemma 4.4, we can give an upper bound on psucc as follows.
psucc =
1
2
(Tr(ΠRρ0) + 〈QH |ρ0|QH〉) ≤ 1
2
(1 +
√
ε+ c
√
δ) .
Protocol 4 QIP(2) protocol for L with non-adaptive smooth locally quantum reductions.
Let γ = (⌈ 12ndmin ⌉)2 and γ′ = (⌈2ndmax⌉)2, where dmin = minq∈{0,1}n Pr[q ∼ Dn] and dmax =
maxq∈{0,1}n Pr[q ∼ Dn].
1. The verifier’s query. The verifier prepares the state
|S〉MV Π := 1√
2
(|Q˜〉M1V1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Q˜〉Mγ′Vγ′ |0〉Π + |T 〉M1V1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |T 〉Mγ′Vγ′ |1〉Π).
The message registersM1, . . . ,Mγ′ are sent to the prover, and the verifier keeps V1, . . . , Vγ′
and Π. |Q˜〉 can be prepared from γ copies of |QD〉 by applying QRSampling(D → U).
2. The prover’s response. The prover applies some unitary UPM1...Mγ′ on registersM1 . . .Mγ′
and its private register P and sends the message registers back to the verifier.
3. The verifier’s verification. The verifier applies C to erase q in V1 . . . Vγ′ . The verifier
then measures Π to obtain b ∈ {0, 1}, and does the following:
• (Computation verification) If b = 0, apply QRSampling(U → D) to get a state
|Q˜HD 〉, apply R on |Q˜HD 〉 and measure the output qubit. Accept if the outcome is 0.
• (Trap verification) If b = 1, apply VT on MiVi for i ∈ [γ′] and measure. Accept if
the outcome is all 0.
By the same proof as in Section 4.2, we generalize Theorem 5.2 to Theorem 5.5.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose there exists a one-query smooth locally quantum reduction with constant
error from a worst-case decision problem L to Inv-OWP. Then there exists a QIP (2) protocol with
completeness 1− ǫ/2 and soundness 1/2 + 2√ǫ for L, where ǫ is negligible.
5.2 Non-adaptive quantum worst-case to average-case reductions
The same idea above actually also works for the non-adaptive quantum worst-case to average-case
reduction defined in Definition 3.2. We show that if the queries are generated arbitrarily according
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to known smooth-computable distributions, i.e., the distributions of each query can be different
but are smooth-computable and known, then the existence of such reductions also implies coNP⊆
QIP(2). We call this reduction known smooth non-adaptive quantum worst-case to average-case
reduction.
Theorem 5.6. Suppose there exists a known smooth non-adaptive quantum worst-case to average-
case reduction with average hardness δ (G,R) from a worst-case decision problem L to Inv-OWP.
Then, there exists a QIP(2) protocol with completeness 1− ǫ/2 and soundness 1/2 + 2√ǫ for L
Proof. Suppose (G,R) is the reduction and G generates k uniform queries. Given any function g
which is δ-close to f−1 as Definition 2.5. Then, the smooth non-adaptive worst-case to average-case
reduction is as follows:
|x, 0〉 G−→ (
∑
q
√
d1,q|q, 0, wx(q)〉)⊗ · · · ⊗ (
∑
q
√
dk,q|q, 0, wx(q)〉)
Og−−→ (
∑
q
√
d1,q|q, f−1(q), wx(q)〉)⊗ · · · ⊗ (
∑
q
√
dk,q|q, f−1(q), wx(q)〉)
R−→ √p|L(x)〉|ψx,0〉+
√
1− p|1− L(x)〉|ψx,1〉,
where p ≥ 2/3 and di,q are the probability that q is drawn from a smooth-computable distribution
D(i)|q| . Note that D
(i)
|q| can be difference from D
(j)
|q| for i 6= j. The error of the reduction can be reduced
to an exponentially small parameter ǫ by Lemma 4.8.
Given such a reduction from L to Inv-OWP, Protocol 4 decides L. It is worth noting that
since the distribution of each query is known and smooth-computable, one can apply quantum
resampling for uniform distribution as in Protocol 4. For completeness, the honest prover always
simulates Of−1 , which is the same honest prover considered in Theorem 5.2. Hence, the verifier
accepts with probability at least 1− ǫ2 . For soundness, if the prover’s operation is δ-close to Of−1 ,
then the verifier accepts with probability ≤ (1+ ǫ)/2. Else if it chooses an operation U ′PM which is
not close to any δ-close oracle for Of−1 , then the modified trap state must be far from the original
trap state. By the calculation in Section 5.1, we get the same upper bound on the soundness.
The following two corollaries follow from Theorem 5.6.
Corollary 5.7. If there exists a known smooth non-adaptive quantum worst-case to average-case
reduction from a worst-case decision problem which is NP-hard to Inv-OWP, then coNP ⊆ QIP(2)
Corollary 5.8. If there exists a known smooth non-adaptive quantum worst-case to average-case
reduction from a worst-case promise problem which is QMA-hard to Inv-OWP, then coQMA ⊆
QIP(2)
5.3 Fixed-preimage-sized functions and quantum-sampling oracles
One interesting question to address is whether the protocol we give in Section 4.1 can be used for
more general functions. We observe that it indeed extends to functions which have fixed preimage
size and surjective (onto), e.g., k-to-1 functions, if the oracle in the reduction is capable of quantum
sampling from all k preimages. To be more specific, this reduction follows Definition 3.1 except
that the response of each query changes to
|QH〉 = 1√
2n
∑
q∈Zm
2
(|q〉 1√|f−1(q)|
∑
z∈f−1(q)
|z〉)|wx(q), q〉,
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where the oracle gives a uniform superposition of all solutions to q. We call such reductions locally
quantum reduction with a quantum-sampling oracle. This kind of oracle has been considered
in cryptography. For instance, Bacon et al. [BCvD06] showed that the dihedral hidden subgroup
problem reduces to quantum sampling subset sum solutions. Our result naturally generalizes when
considering this kind of reductions.
Corollary 5.9. If there exists a uniform one-query locally quantum reduction with a quantum-
sampling oracle from a worst-case NP-hard decision problem L to inverting a one-way function
which is fixed-preimage-sized and surjective, then L ∈ QIP(2).
Proof. This can be done by forcing the prover to give a superposition of all preimages. Suppose the
function is k-to-1 and onto, we use the same protocol in Section 4.1 except that the honest prover
replies
|QH〉MV = 1√
2n
∑
q∈Zm
2
(|q〉 1√|f−1(q)|
∑
z∈f−1(q)
|z〉)M |wx(q), q〉V (22)
|TH〉MV = 1√
2n
∑
q∈Zm
2
(|q〉 1√|f−1(q)|
∑
z∈f−1(q)
|z〉)M |0, q〉V . (23)
It is not hard to see that |TH〉MV can be mapped to all-zero state by the same unitary in the
protocol of Section 4.1. Furthermore, since |QH〉 and |TH〉 have the same reduced density matrix
in M , Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 can be applied.
We can extend Corollary 5.9 to locally quantum reductions with a quantum-sampling oracle,
multiple non-adaptive queries, and smooth-computable distributions.
6 Oracle separation between co-NP and QIP
In this section, we show an oracle A such that co-NPA * QIP(2)A.
Theorem 6.1. There exists an oracle A and a language L(A) ∈ coNPA such that L(A) /∈ QIP(2)A.
Proof. We first define the language L(A) on any oracle A. For any oracle A, let
L(A) = {1n : A contains all strings of length n}.
It is not hard to see that L(A) ∈ coNP. Specifically, if 1n is not in L(A), then there exists an n-bit
string a which is not in A, and thus a can be a certificate.
To show there exists an oracle A such that L(A) /∈ QIP(2)A, we create the oracle A in stages
as in [FS88] via the diagonization technique. We enumerate all possible quantum verifiers in the
manner such that Vi is bounded in time by n
i, where n is the input size. Then, every verifier Vi
will fail to recognize 1Ni for some Ni large enough. The main challenge in adapting to the quantum
setting is to program the oracle without changing an algorithm’s output by too much, even if it
can query the oracle in quantum superposition.
Consider Vi, we pick Ni large enough such that 2
Ni > 12(Ni)
2i and no oracle queries of length
Ni has been made by verifier V1, . . . , Vi−1. Note that Vi can only make queries with length at most
(Ni)
i and at most (Ni)
i queries since the running time is bounded by (Ni)
i. Now, every time Vi
makes queries which have not been queried before, we let the oracle A output 1. If there is no
prover can convince Vi that 1
Ni is in L(A) with probability at least 2/3, then we let A contains all
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strings with length Ni. Otherwise, if there exists a prover which can convince Vi that 1
Ni ∈ L(A)
with probability at least 2/3, then there must exist an Ni-bit string x such that the sum of its
query amplitude is at most (Ni)
i
2Ni/2
. Finally, we use the hybrid argument as in [BBBV97]. Let Vi be
U(Ni)i+1AU(Ni)iA · · ·AU1. Let A′ = A except that A′(x) = 0. Then, for any initial state |ψ〉
‖U(Ni)i+1AU(Ni)iA · · ·AU1|ψ〉 − U(Ni)i+1A′U(Ni)iA′ · · ·A′U1|ψ〉‖ ≤
2(Ni)
i
2Ni/2
.
This implies that the probability that the probability that the same prover convinces Vi with oracle
A′ is 23 − 4(Ni)
2i
2Ni
≥ 13 . This contradicts the hypothesis that there is no prover can convince Vi to
accept 1Ni with probability at most 1/3.
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